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The following is an abridged recording and transcript of a speech recently delivered by Tan Sri Andrew Sheng
(http://www.andrewsheng.com/), distinguished speaker at Singapore Management University's Ngee Ann Kongsi
Annual Lecture Series, titled 'Global Regulatory Reforms and their Implications for Asia and its Financial Systems'. 
Sheng is presently chief adviser to the China Banking Regulatory Commission, and an adjunct professor at both
Tsinghua University in Beijing, as well as the University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur. His latest book, From Asian to
Global Financial Crisis: An Asian Regulator's View of Unfettered Finance in the 1990s and 2000s
(http://www.amazon.com/Asian-Global-Financial-Crisis-International/dp/0521134153/ref=sr_1_1?
ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1243571578&sr=8-1), was published by Cambridge University Press.
Listen to the lecture:
Download MP3 (http://www.mysmu.edu/staff/knwsmu/sheng.mp3)
Read the transcript:
The world has just gone through its deepest, most complex financial crisis since the 1930s. No one can, of course,
agree on the real causes or solutions. It's all been controversial. The only thing we can agree on is that this crisis is
much deeper and more costly than anyone has ever imagined, and I would be stupid if I were to declare before you,
that this crisis is over.
Last month, I was at the first Singapore global dialogue, organised by the Rajaratnam School of International
Studies, and I said: We need global governance because of the threat from weapons of mass destruction, and there
are three: the first is nuclear and biological weapons. The second is terrorism. And the third is finance. But we deal
with these problems very differently. In the first two categories, you make them war criminals. For the last one, we
give them more bonuses.
We have to pay very serious attention to this crisis because all of us are paying for this, through zero interest rates
on our deposits for years to come, higher taxation, or lost jobs. Now most of you would be familiar with most of the
reforms, so I'm not going to go into this. The official view is that we've done the fastest and most comprehensive
reforms ever made, which the bankers are very angry about.
The critical view, considered by bankers as 'the lunatic fringe', is to say that nothing has changed, finance and
world order has been captured by oligarchs; bankers are laughing all the way to higher bonuses, and that there will
be another large crisis looming. Who said this? The oligarch story is from Simon Johnston, who happens to be the
former chief economist of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). So this is a divided camp.
How did we get here?
University of Chicago professor and Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals judge, Richard Posner said there are four key
reasons for this crisis. First, incompetent monetary policy, which produced the housing bubble; second, the
inattention of the US Federal Reserve (Fed) and the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), who didn't
understand the changing nature of the banking industry; third, the over-indebtedness of the American people and
government, which has hampered the restoration of credit; and last but not least, the failure of the US Treasury and
the Fed to realise that Lehman Brothers' bankruptcy would trigger a run on the banking industry, causing a global
credit freeze.
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How did we get into this? We have to go back a little bit through history. It was a combination of globalisation,
financial deregulation, communications technology and financial engineering that gave this period, since the 1980s,
what's called "the Great Moderation": very strong growth and very low inflation. This period of stability gave
complacency on the part of central bankers and financial supervisors, who were then imbued by this free market
fundamentalism to allow unfettered financial engineering.
The result was unprecedented growth in finance; growing from roughly 108 percent GDP to roughly five times global
GDP by the end of 2008. But if you include the notional value of financial derivatives, the leverage is roughly 15
times. So the whole banking industry had become very highly geared, had almost no liquidity, and depended mostly
on central banks to fund them, in the event they got into trouble. Add to this, a dangerous blend of complexity
which no one, including the regulators, understood the dangers of systemic risks in this highly interconnected
system.
Those of you who have read Keynes and followed Professor Hyman Minsky would be familiar with what he calls the
three phases of financing:
1. Hedge financing: You have enough money to pay all your debts, service your interests, plus capital
repayment; this is the safe kind.
2. Speculative financing is when your cash flow can pay the interest, but you can't pay the principal. But as long
as you pay the interest, everyone's happy – a little speculative, but it's alright.
3. Ponzi financing is when you only need another piece of paper (debt) to 'repay' your interest and principal when
your debt comes due.  You are borrowing from Peter to pay Paul and if both decide not to lend further to you,
the Ponzi financing collapses.
Unfortunately, through sheer complacency or neglect, financial regulators allowed financial engineers to escalate
Ponzi financing to crisis levels. Through securitisation, leverage, leverage-on-leverage (such as CDO2s), the
complicities of the rating agencies, procyclical accounting and regulatory standards, lax oversight, no thorough
examination, the financial engineers built a shadow banking system that, at its height, was larger than the traditional
banking system.
Shadow banking was created basically through regulatory arbitrage – if you regulate me, I move all my business
outside your regulatory perspective, and if you try to regulate that, I'll move offshore. At its height, the shadow
banking industry was US$ 20 trillion dollars, and the traditional banking system was US$ 14 trillion. Our advanced
market regulators were watching the wrong suspects. So you're looking at the guy who's badly dressed, thinking
that he's the bank robber, whereas it's the well dressed guy who's been taking all the money out of the vaults.
Shadows, dilemmas and hazards
As you may recall, in 2006, Ben Bernanke wrote a very important paper blaming the inability to manage monetary
policy in the US on the savings glut of Asia. I said, how is it that the banker who gets into trouble blames his
depositors for depositing too much money? It doesn't make sense. How big was China in 2006? US$2.5 trillion dollars
in GDP. How big was the shadow banking industry? US$20 trillion. So who has been creating the money to cause
lower and lower interest rates?  The shadow banking industry!  Was the shadow banking industry credit included in
the monetary aggregates for which the central bank should be monitoring? The answer is No. We contributed to
global savings, but we didn't contribute that much to global credit.  The shadow banking industry created credit that
the advanced country central banks did not monitor or control. 
The shadow banking system had core capital adequacy levels down all the way to 2-3 percent, and only 1 percent
liquidity. In the 1960s, the core capital adequacy ratio of developed countries' banks was 8 percent. In the 1930s, it
was 25 percent, and the liquidity level was 30 percent.   If capital adequacy has gone down to 2 percent, so are
you surprised when the market volatility is 5 percent per day, these systems go bust?
To be fair to the advanced country regulators, they were made complacent because the system had withstood the
1987 crash, the 1991 Sterling crisis, the 1997/98 Asian financial crisis, and the 2000 dot com bubble. In hindsight,
they missed five major parts of the picture: the history, political context, the global financial architecture, the macro
(economics) and the micro-incentive.
On the history part, they forgot that every ten years, we have a crisis. The political context was that if the West
goes into over-consumption, they have to fund this. The funding of this was essentially through financial
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engineering. Democratic societies have one defect; everybody wants taxes to be cut as low as possible, but welfare
expenditure should increase as much as possible. Something's got to give, and therefore, you do it through greater
and greater leverage.
But actually, the problem lies in the global financial architecture. The global financial architecture hinges on what is
known as the Triffin dilemma for the dollar as the reserve currency.
The Triffin dilemma is named after a Belgian (Yale University) economist who, in the 1970s, wrote about the dollar
crisis and said that the US got into the dollar crisis because it violates the dilemma that the central bank of the
reserve currency country has to run a monetary policy that does not fit its own needs. So if the rest of the world is
growing faster than the US, the US has to run a monetary policy that is much looser than what it needs; the
difference is the current account deficit.
So the US kept on feeding the global liquidity because the world needs it, but in doing so, its own current account
deficit got bigger and bigger. The global imbalance is actually an accumulation of annual deficits that ultimately
became a very large balance sheet deficit.
The fourth issue is that the rising asset bubbles were both causes and effects of bad macroeconomic policies.
Because the central bank was focused on monetary targeting, they missed the idea that the lower and lower
interest rates were actually feeding the asset bubble, and that it was financed through Ponzi activities of funding
derivatives.
Because there was a central bank put – what this means is that if you speculate on the stock market and the stock
market drops; you expect the Fed to lower the interest rate; and everybody gets bailed out – and that's really a
moral hazard. Moral hazard means that if every time a child makes a mistake, the parents pick things up, (the child)
will always keep on making mistakes because (he's) not going to learn from this. So every time this happens, the
central bank keeps on bailing them out, including this crisis where everyone got bailed out, it’s the ultimate moral
hazard.
But the most difficult part is the micro-incentive issue. It took me a while to figure this, but the whole idea is that
we sell you stuff that maybe you don't understand; promise you dreams; and if you're the last guy holding onto it,
you pay. Who paid this time round? Ultimately, the governments of the advanced countries! Basically what they did
was to take the losses from the financial industry and shift it into the balance sheets of the public sector.
So you have unprecedented balance sheets of central banks that are three times larger than just before the crisis. 
(All these) can only be done with very complex accounting and regulatory standards, and this is the trick: you have
to value assets according to three categories. Level one is Fair Value Accounting: what the market says is the right
level. Level two: if there's no market for prices, we use a model to estimate the value. Level three is: the judgement
of the management.
Creative accounting for bigger payouts
If you really look at what's happened; because the bankers benefit most from the pricing of the derivatives, are you
surprised that 'my judgement' is an overvaluation of the assets and undervaluation of the liabilities? And guess what?
The (discounted cash flow) model for pricing the level two assets depends on the interest rate – the lower the
interest rate, the higher the level two asset valuation, and if the liability is below the line and you can't see it, the
profit of the bank is very good. Guess what again?  30-70 percent of the profits of the bank go to the compensation
and bonus pool. 
How is it possible that a financial engineer can earn five times the salary of a real civil engineer or a chemical
engineer, etc? What makes finance so fantastic that they can walk on water? The answer is: it's underwritten by
the government, because when they fail, the government picks up the bill, and in the end, you and I pick up the bill.
So what's the solution? The solution is that they have introduced quantitative easing and a zero interest rate policy.
What is Asia going to do about it? All that we have been taught in Asia is wrong, because the more you save, the
more you bear the burden of this crisis.
Navigating a distorted environment
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IMF data for 2008 showed that surplus countries had US$7.9 trillion worth of net foreign exchange surpluses; they
account for US$16 trillion of GDP, when the world had US$60 trillion of GDP. One quarter of the GDP of the poor
countries had just under 50 percent of their GDPs lent to the rich countries. The deficit countries, basically US and
Europe, had a deficit of US$6.8 trillion, roughly a quarter of their GDP, which was US$29 trillion, just under 50
percent of world GDP.
The poor guys are lending to the rich guys. But, now they are saying: I want you to revalue. How much is the
revaluation going to cost? Ten percent revaluation of US$7.9 trillion is a book loss or a stock loss of 790 billion
dollars – five percent of developing countries' GDP.  This excludes the flow shocks from loss of jobs, lower trade and
other consequences.
In case you're not shocked, let me quote for you what Singapore would go through. Singapore has a net foreign
asset equivalent of US$220 billion at the end of 2008, equivalent to 120 percent of GDP. A ten percent revaluation
of the Singapore dollar against the US dollar, assuming that all assets are in US dollar would be an accounting loss of
US$22 billion, equivalent to 18 percent of Singapore's GDP.
What are we going to do? We're living in a very distorted environment. Take the three factors of production: land,
labour and capital. The price of capital is zero – the zero interest rate policy. The price of labour is very cheap
because there are many Indian, Chinese, Indonesian, Vietnamese, Bangladeshi workers who are willing to work
cheaply. So if these two prices are below market, what is the land price? Way above market; and this is exactly
what we're seeing.
If we try to raise interest rate, there'd be a ton of money coming in, and we can't stop it. Asia is now in this
unenviable position of having too much money coming in, (and the) exchange rate revaluation has caused a stock
loss, as well as structural adjustment, and a growing asset bubble which Singapore and Hong Kong are already very
concerned about. But we can't deal with this through monetary policy; you can't lower interest rate below zero.
The real trouble is that we have global gain but local pain. Everybody's acting on their own interests, and so we
have a global tragedy of commons. We can't act on our own, and so it's a race to the bottom.  
People say that the race to the bottom will be caused by capital flows? Capital flows is an effect, and it's an effect
because it's highly leveraged. No central bank will find it easy to defend against the barbarians at the gate because
the barbarians at the gate are leveraged. They put 1-3 percent down and they can 'play' with 100 of your local
currency, whilst central bank reserves to defend the local currency are not borrowed money.  That's why people are
now talking about capital controls.
How do you steer this boat in this highly distorted environment, and how do you satisfy both national needs and
global needs? My own assessment is this: I think that globalisation will require Asia to acquire its own stance on how
to develop its financial system according to global standards. For us to be able to negotiate with advanced
countries, we need to have very strong domestic financial systems. We have to be strong in order to integrate,
otherwise, we become lunch.
But if Asia is to shoulder greater responsibilities – and that's what the West wants – then our mindsets, institutions,
knowledge base and modus operandi will really have to be very significantly different from today. Asia has grown
bigger, but the mindset is still very much 'poor country'.  The thinking is that maybe the advanced countries should
deal with the global responsibilities', etc.
However, (Asia's) new mind and new body must solve five major problems. These are the global financial
architecture, the moral high ground, the financial and accounting standards, the too-big-to-fail problem, and the
need for regional and global cooperation. There's no way Asia can challenge the Euro and the dollar as reserve
currencyies within the next twenty years. The reason for this is very simple: Asia cannot get its act together. Asia
cannot agree on what is the right thing to do for Asian currencies.
Everybody talks about the reforms of the IMF, and they are interesting but not critical. Why do I say this? The IMF
is neither a lender of last resort nor a regulator. The reason why the global architecture is defective is that we have
no global monetary policy, we have no global regulatory policy (we have to do this through cooperation with each
other) and we have a zero global tax base.
The reason why a national currency can be stable is that you have a central bank monetary policy, you have a
domestic regulator, and you have a ministry of finance.  But who is the ministry of finance for the world? Answer:
Nobody. Tax power is national. Nobody's willing to give that to the IMF or any global central bank. So this is a major
problem that cannot be solved, but I'm proposing that the financial turnover tax and the financial services tax be
implemented within Asia, and we must agree on this, because if we don't solve this, we don't solve some of the
volatility even within Asia.
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From followers to leaders
The trouble is that the regional finance architecture within Asia has no solution. The good news is that the debate is
beginning. The bad news is that we have no institutional infrastructure to have this debate properly. Where is the
Asian Bank for International Settlements (BIS)? Where is the Asian Monetary Fund?
It's not that the global financial architecture is defective because it's unrepresentative. It is defective because
there's no effective hard budget constraint on the global reserve currency in violation of the Triffin Dilemma. That is:
who's going to tell the US, 'You can't print too much money'? Who's going to tell the shadow banking system: 'You
can't give credit like this'?
The second issue that I want to talk about is that Western finance is strong because it commanded the high
ground; the moral high ground was 'We will look after your money.' But after this crisis, unfortunately, this moral high
ground has gone down one or two notches.
The third issue has to do with accounting and regulatory standards that are flawed. These are complex issues. To
some extent, accounting standards have become a little bit more like religion. It depends on the assumption that fair
value is determined by the market. But if the market is wrong, then what is fair value?
Our problem is that we don't have proper rules, and we're using global rules, and this comes back to the problem
that I finally realised: Asia has always been a price-taker; not a price-maker; Asia has always been a rule-taker, not
a rule-maker. But if Asia is going to be an equal in the world, then you have to shape how that rule is formed.
If you're going to shape the rule, you'd better have the think tanks and the expertise to be able to debate this as
equals. We need the research institutes in Asia, studying all of this, to say, 'This is right; this is wrong; why this is
right; why this is wrong' – and these (can) feed back into the debate in Asia, so that Asia can take its stance and
say, 'Sorry, this is not in our interest.'
This research work is exactly what the Singapore Management University and research institutes in Asia should be
doing now, as a matter of urgency. Asia spends a lot of money on hardware but not enough on software. And until
we spend enough on software, and get our thinking and values right, the Asian model cannot compete with the Wall
Street model.
Asia does not have the power imbalance between finance and the real sector, because the largest financial systems
in Asia are largely government owned or linked.
This might solve the power problem; it doesn't solve the innovation problem – and that's the heart of the problem.
When the state owns and controls the industry, it won't allow finance to be larger and more powerful than the
state. But, your innovation is limited because everyone's obedient, obeying the rules, and risk-adverse. Of course,
our commercial banks are traditional, risk-adverse, and rightly so. We cannot expect our commercial banks to
become investment bankers overnight.
Bank of Japan deputy governor Nishimura put this very well: 'We cannot put carnivorous lions in the same cage as
herbivorous commercial bankers.' The trouble is that if we don't train our own carnivorous lions, how are we going to
compete against the carnivorous lions on Wall Street? Therefore, if we are not careful, are Asia's herbivorous
elephants the next victims for the global carnivorous lions? This is a Darwinian question to which we don't have an
answer, but we have to face up to this.
Collective evolution
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The real issue within Asia today is what model are we going to adopt? Is it going to be the one in which the market
absorbs the risks, or is it where the state absorbs the risks – which is what's happening within Asia, and ultimately,
what's been happening in the West. The real problem now is that profits are privatised and losses are socialised.
That is the dilemma, because once the West has adopted a zero interest rate policy, we cannot use interest rate as
the tool to regulate the supply and demand for real funds. That's why a lot of the credit distribution are through
administrative controls, quantitative controls, and it depends very much upon how astute your regulators, your
central banks and your policy makers are, in mimicking the market, because the market is not a guide (in a situation
of distorted prices and large intervention by the state).
To sum up, the global crisis has completely changed the global landscape. It has changed because the state is now
more powerful than before. The swing is from the right to the left. We are in an era that none of us have been
before. Everyone is crossing the river by feeling the stones; we don't know how deep the water is, we don't know
what the issues are. The only thing I can personally conclude is that there is unlikely to be a big bang in Asian
financial reforms. There will be no fundamental reform until it finally sinks in with Asians that the Wall Street model is
irretrievably broken.
A lot of people might say that's not true and I'm not sure many Asian bankers will agree with that view. But if we do
not find a viable model for Asia, we will end up paying a lot for this crisis. That, I have no doubt at all. We're already
paying for it. If we don't find a model, we will pay even more.
There's a realisation that the Asian growth story is all about demographics, about changing consumer tastes, and
fundamental industrial structure. We need to move from export to domestic growth; our people are ageing; our
people are saving in very different patterns, and so the banks have to evolve with this. But, as long as our
regulators still control on the risk side, the bankers won't evolve to be competitive in this area. So, in my view, the
role of the research institutes is of even greater priority today. All I can say; none of us is smarter than all of us,
and we should really begin to think very deeply on these issues.
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